'Getting more bang for our euro'
There would be many benefits to what has been referred to
widely as a European Army (usually by detractors) or European Defence Force.
I’ve chosen to refer to this theoretical organisation as a European Union
Security Force (EUSF) rather than a Defence Force because in much of the
literature one assumed role of any such organisation is UN mandated peacekeeping
operations outside EU borders, similar to the one undertaken by EUFOR Althea in
Bosnia.
It has been argued, particularly by Eurosceptics, that an
organisation like the EUSF would undermine both NATO and the Trans-Atlantic
alliance. The reality is far less clear cut. The Center on the United States
and Europe suggest that in fact the status quo of uncoordinated defence cuts is
damaging the EUs, and therefore NATOs, capabilities far more than a centralised
EUSF would.1
As for the Trans-Atlantic alliance it is widely known that
the US draw down in Europe and the Middle East2 are being followed
by subsequent redeployments to the Pacific. In 2010 the US accounted for 75% of
NATO defence spending, however in this time of austerity the Pentagon is
naturally having to make cuts ($489bn over ten years3) in addition
to Europe’s, so it’s inevitable that America will expect Europe to begin
pulling its weight. If the EU is serious about the importance of its
Trans-Atlantic alliance then it should demonstrate its commitment, either
through increased spending or, more reasonably in the current economic climate,
to find a way of maximising the efficiency of its defence expenditure.
One of the main problems levelled at EU military
capabilities, when viewed as a whole, is that it is much less than the sum of
its parts. This is largely due to the duplication of efforts which is itself a
result of nationally prioritised defence spending. This national prioritisation
of spending, and more recently cuts, has not been conducive to the kind
regional coordination required to reduce duplication.
A benefit of a centrally organised EUSF is that it would
help to reduce inefficiency. Despite the EUs vast defence spending, the second
largest in the world, much of this spending is wasted on duplication. If this
duplication was eliminated then money could be directed towards boosting
effective deployment capabilities. Currently the EU gets a lot less ‘bang for
its euro’ than the US, spending roughly 40% of what the US does on defence
whilst only being able to sustain 25% the number of troops on external
operations that the US can.3
Another criticism of any potential EUSF that is often cited is
the potential loss of EU member states rapid reaction capabilities. At best the
current institutions in place represent a commitment to shared values,
multilateralism, recognition of mutual interests and common security threats
but little else. As it stands, in the case of EUFOR, unanimous agreement is
required within the EU before a deployment can take place. Reaching such
agreements, which are ultimately political in nature, takes time. The divergent
priorities of member states could potentially inhibit or even prevent rapid
reactions to security situations, this is of course highly undesirable to say
the least. This means a different decision reaching strategy would need to be
implemented, one where majority rather than unanimous decisions are made. This
would also require an end to national vetoes. This may sound like an unlikely
and radical proposal however it is one that has already been made by Germany
with the support of other EU nations4. If this move were successful
then a EUSF would be far more capable of responding quickly to security
situations. On a further note I feel it would necessary, if any such treaty
were to be passed, for member states, particularly Britain and France, to be
given assurances when it comes to the protection of overseas dependencies such
as the Falklands Islands and French Guiana that full military action would be taken
to defend them if necessary.
A centralised European military like a EUSF would face many
hurdles before it could ever become a reality but the evolution of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy5 and the European Defence Agency6,
which is designed to facilitate EU wide defence cooperation, procurement and
research, has been a good start. If the EUSF comes into existence it would give
us an opportunity to drive up the overall quality of EU armed forces,
particularly form poorer member states, whilst at the same time driving down procurement
costs and improving expenditure efficiency.
In the 21st Century power projection is going to
increasingly be the name of the game. The nature and focus of conflicts is
likely to shift in the face of an ever growing global population towards
smaller scale engagements in areas of resource scarcity. The multiplicity of
potential flash points across the globe will require a well-funded, highly
motivated and adaptable force to counter them. The volatile nature of much of
the EUs neighbours from North Africa and the Middle East to the Balkans and the
Caucasus means there is going to be, for the foreseeable future, a necessity
for Europe to defend itself and its allies. The question the EU has to ask
itself is, do we want to get more ‘bang for our euro?’.
1 C. Mölling, July 2012. ‘The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members’,
Center on the United States and Europe. Brookings.
3 D.Keohane, May 2012. ‘Does NATO matter for US defence policy?’,
FRIDE.
6
European Defence Agency, November 2012. ‘About
us’, http://www.eda.europa.eu/home.
