Showing posts with label Common Foreign and Security Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Common Foreign and Security Policy. Show all posts

Monday, 14 January 2013

Mali, A Very European Intervention?



The French intervention in Mali follows recent territorial gains by the Islamist extremist group Ansar Dine which culminated in the capture of Konna1. The group had taken control of much of the north of the West African country (an area frequently referred to as being the size of France) and this was considered the extent of the group’s reach. The UN had called for an African led intervention just before Christmas2 and the French had been discussing a training mission in Mali a few months prior to that, though they had ruled out any action until September. However clearly the fast changing situation on the ground worried Paris enough that they felt action was needed (though it seems likely French forces were already prepared for this eventuality).

But is this intervention justified? Well one look at the litany of atrocities committed by Ansar Dine could well be enough to justify the action. From a strategic point of view the Al-Qaida linked group is certainly not an organisation the EU and neighbouring countries want in control of vast areas of West Africa, potentially providing recruitment, training and shelter for extremist elements. Although the interim government’s legitimacy has been called in to question because of the army’s coup in March 2012 it is still worth noting that the government asked France for military intervention. Some have asked, hinting at French hypocrisy, why France has intervened in Mali but not in the Democratic Republic of Congo which also recently called on France for military intervention to help in fighting the M23 rebels. Well I feel the comparison is unfair, the M23 rebels have demonstrated that by agreeing to a ceasefire and peace talks3, this is a highly unlikely outcome in Mali especially whilst Ansar Dine’s had been succeeding. This intervention seems to have galvanised Mali’s neighbours into action and on Saturday Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal all committed to send troops whilst the UK is supplying France with logistical support4.

Could this be a model for future European interventions? Whatever your particular view on this intervention it’s still worth examining its implementation. The French have managed to land a considerable military force (some hundreds) close to Konna. They quickly captured Konna and have halted and are even reversing Ansar Dine’s gains, though the situation is so fluid at the moment. With France’s strong military presence in West Africa their forces on the ground already had air support and logistics in place to carry out this intervention so it is perhaps not going to be the exact example for any future European interventions but there are several things in place in this instance that we should seek to replicate, in particular the regional and global support. Without this kind of support there is no hope of a long term solution, much less a viable exit strategy.

In this case I am in favour of the French intervention, as stated the nature of the Ansar Dine extremists (and the defeated Tuareg mercenaries who fled Libya after the defeat of Gaddafi) makes it very hard even for the most die-hard of apologists to defend, especially given their strength in the region. That said intervention isn’t always the answer and we need to try diplomacy when possible, hence the Common Foreign and Security Policy (you can’t have one without the other. But to dismiss intervention completely is just as extreme as to consistently insist on military intervention. This operation bares similarities to Sierra Leone and in some aspects Libya. Should Europe be drawn more and more into similar situations it will be very important to learn the lessons of these modern conflicts. The real test for France will be to avoid mission creep and put in place a feasible exit strategy as soon as possible.

By James Taylor.

Monday, 26 November 2012

An argument for a European Union Security Force

'Getting more bang for our euro'



There would be many benefits to what has been referred to widely as a European Army (usually by detractors) or European Defence Force. I’ve chosen to refer to this theoretical organisation as a European Union Security Force (EUSF) rather than a Defence Force because in much of the literature one assumed role of any such organisation is UN mandated peacekeeping operations outside EU borders, similar to the one undertaken by EUFOR Althea in Bosnia.

It has been argued, particularly by Eurosceptics, that an organisation like the EUSF would undermine both NATO and the Trans-Atlantic alliance. The reality is far less clear cut. The Center on the United States and Europe suggest that in fact the status quo of uncoordinated defence cuts is damaging the EUs, and therefore NATOs, capabilities far more than a centralised EUSF would.1

As for the Trans-Atlantic alliance it is widely known that the US draw down in Europe and the Middle East2 are being followed by subsequent redeployments to the Pacific. In 2010 the US accounted for 75% of NATO defence spending, however in this time of austerity the Pentagon is naturally having to make cuts ($489bn over ten years3) in addition to Europe’s, so it’s inevitable that America will expect Europe to begin pulling its weight. If the EU is serious about the importance of its Trans-Atlantic alliance then it should demonstrate its commitment, either through increased spending or, more reasonably in the current economic climate, to find a way of maximising the efficiency of its defence expenditure.

One of the main problems levelled at EU military capabilities, when viewed as a whole, is that it is much less than the sum of its parts. This is largely due to the duplication of efforts which is itself a result of nationally prioritised defence spending. This national prioritisation of spending, and more recently cuts, has not been conducive to the kind regional coordination required to reduce duplication.


A benefit of a centrally organised EUSF is that it would help to reduce inefficiency. Despite the EUs vast defence spending, the second largest in the world, much of this spending is wasted on duplication. If this duplication was eliminated then money could be directed towards boosting effective deployment capabilities. Currently the EU gets a lot less ‘bang for its euro’ than the US, spending roughly 40% of what the US does on defence whilst only being able to sustain 25% the number of troops on external operations that the US can.3

Another criticism of any potential EUSF that is often cited is the potential loss of EU member states rapid reaction capabilities. At best the current institutions in place represent a commitment to shared values, multilateralism, recognition of mutual interests and common security threats but little else. As it stands, in the case of EUFOR, unanimous agreement is required within the EU before a deployment can take place. Reaching such agreements, which are ultimately political in nature, takes time. The divergent priorities of member states could potentially inhibit or even prevent rapid reactions to security situations, this is of course highly undesirable to say the least. This means a different decision reaching strategy would need to be implemented, one where majority rather than unanimous decisions are made. This would also require an end to national vetoes. This may sound like an unlikely and radical proposal however it is one that has already been made by Germany with the support of other EU nations4. If this move were successful then a EUSF would be far more capable of responding quickly to security situations. On a further note I feel it would necessary, if any such treaty were to be passed, for member states, particularly Britain and France, to be given assurances when it comes to the protection of overseas dependencies such as the Falklands Islands and French Guiana that full military action would be taken to defend them if necessary.

A centralised European military like a EUSF would face many hurdles before it could ever become a reality but the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy5 and the European Defence Agency6, which is designed to facilitate EU wide defence cooperation, procurement and research, has been a good start. If the EUSF comes into existence it would give us an opportunity to drive up the overall quality of EU armed forces, particularly form poorer member states, whilst at the same time driving down procurement costs and improving expenditure efficiency.

In the 21st Century power projection is going to increasingly be the name of the game. The nature and focus of conflicts is likely to shift in the face of an ever growing global population towards smaller scale engagements in areas of resource scarcity. The multiplicity of potential flash points across the globe will require a well-funded, highly motivated and adaptable force to counter them. The volatile nature of much of the EUs neighbours from North Africa and the Middle East to the Balkans and the Caucasus means there is going to be, for the foreseeable future, a necessity for Europe to defend itself and its allies. The question the EU has to ask itself is, do we want to get more ‘bang for our euro?’.




1 C. Mölling, July 2012. ‘The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members’, Center on the United States and Europe. Brookings.

2 P. Allen, S. Jeffery, January 2012. ‘US defence review: the shape of the US military overseas’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2012/jan/06/us-military-deployment-map?INTCMP=SRCH. The Guardian.

3 D.Keohane, May 2012. Does NATO matter for US defence policy?’, FRIDE.

4 I. Traynor, September 2012. ‘EU heavyweights call for radical foreign and defence policy overhaul’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/18/eu-foreign-defence-policy-overhaul. The Guardian.

5 Wikipedia, November 2012. ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Foreign_and_Security_Policy#1957.E2.80.931993.

6 European Defence Agency, November 2012. ‘About us’, http://www.eda.europa.eu/home.