Keeping Britain In the EU

'Hear the Lion's Roar' There are many problems within the EU, a lack of transparency and the so-called democratic deficit to name two of the most serious in my humble opinion. These issues, real or imagined, give ammunition to the Europhobes, and the media that supports them, from London to Paris and beyond. It is these problems that honest British people baulk at, and rightly so. These issues do need to be discussed; the EU project cannot continue at this pace and simply hope no one will notice. Trying to create a federal Europe by stealth will only anger people and in the grand scheme will only set back the Federalist dream. The EU and its supporters need to argue, debate and make the case for it, constantly. There will be set backs but we will live to fight another day. I want the EU to succeed, I want the UK to be at the heart of it, but I don’t want that to be at the cost of our democracy and our liberty. I recognise that 20 years from now if the EU survives it will exist as a de facto Superpower, but the only way it will be allowed to survive is with the consent of its people.   Now, if I read one more thinly veiled semi-racist comment about the ‘awful Brits’ spoiling everything for the continental Federalists I think I’ll burst. Every anti-British commentator seems to think the entire population of Britain is obsessed with the War or the Empire or Roast Beef. It feels like we’re the continents favourite scapegoats and even Barroso and Van Rumpoy tried to isolate and ignore the UK (ie 62 million EU citizens) with its legitimate concerns in a shameful display at the last summit, undiplomatic to say the least. Right now there are far too many comments from self-righteous and self-proclaimed Federalists across the internet that say we should go and good riddance. As a UK Federalist I say SHUT UP, you are not helping our pro-EU cause with such stupid nationalist inspired comments. What we need is support from our continental colleagues and furthermore we, and the rest of the EU, need real discussion and real reform of the central apparatus. I don’t think we would be better off without the EU but I don’t think the EU would be better off without us either. The UK is a net contributor, spends the most on defence, has enviable foreign diplomatic and intelligence services, is the home of the financial capital of Europe (for now), hosts some of the world’s top Universities and to top that off is the motherland of the world’s second language. And I say this to the rest of the EU, like a jealous ex-wife you would miss us, even though you’d never admit it. And we, like a mid-life crisis husband who’s run off with Miss America, would soon realise that we miss your intellectual conversations and pithy but incessant scolding’s. Oh look, I got through all that without mentioning the War, the Empire or Les Rosbif, oh wait...

An argument for a European Union Security Force

'Getting more bang for our euro'

There would be many benefits to what has been referred to widely as a European Army (usually by detractors) or European Defence Force. I’ve chosen to refer to this theoretical organisation as a European Union Security Force (EUSF) rather than a Defence Force because in much of the literature one assumed role of any such organisation is UN mandated peacekeeping operations outside EU borders, similar to the one undertaken by EUFOR Althea in Bosnia.

It has been argued, particularly by Eurosceptics, that an organisation like the EUSF would undermine both NATO and the Trans-Atlantic alliance. The reality is far less clear cut. The Center on the United States and Europe suggest that in fact the status quo of uncoordinated defence cuts is damaging the EUs, and therefore NATOs, capabilities far more than a centralised EUSF would.¹

As for the Trans-Atlantic alliance it is widely known that the US draw down in Europe and the Middle East² are being followed by subsequent redeployments to the Pacific. In 2010 the US accounted for 75% of NATO defence spending, however in this time of austerity the Pentagon is naturally having to make cuts ($489bn over ten years³) in addition to Europe’s, so it’s inevitable that America will expect Europe to begin pulling its weight. If the EU is serious about the importance of its Trans-Atlantic alliance then it should demonstrate its commitment, either through increased spending or, more reasonably in the current economic climate, to find a way of maximising the efficiency of its defence expenditure.

One of the main problems levelled at EU military capabilities, when viewed as a whole, is that it is much less than the sum of its parts. This is largely due to the duplication of efforts which is itself a result of nationally prioritised defence spending. This national prioritisation of spending, and more recently cuts, has not been conducive to the kind regional coordination required to reduce duplication.

A benefit of a centrally organised EUSF is that it would help to reduce inefficiency. Despite the EUs vast defence spending, the second largest in the world, much of this spending is wasted on duplication. If this duplication was eliminated then money could be directed towards boosting effective deployment capabilities. Currently the EU gets a lot less ‘bang for its euro’ than the US, spending roughly 40% of what the US does on defence whilst only being able to sustain 25% the number of troops on external operations that the US can.³

Another criticism of any potential EUSF that is often cited is the potential loss of EU member states rapid reaction capabilities. At best the current institutions in place represent a commitment to shared values, multilateralism, recognition of mutual interests and common security threats but little else. As it stands, in the case of EUFOR, unanimous agreement is required within the EU before a deployment can take place. Reaching such agreements, which are ultimately political in nature, takes time. The divergent priorities of member states could potentially inhibit or even prevent rapid reactions to security situations, this is of course highly undesirable to say the least. This means a different decision reaching strategy would need to be implemented, one where majority rather than unanimous decisions are made. This would also require an end to national vetoes. This may sound like an unlikely and radical proposal however it is one that has already been made by Germany with the support of other EU nations⁴. If this move were successful then a EUSF would be far more capable of responding quickly to security situations. On a further note I feel it would necessary, if any such treaty were to be passed, for member states, particularly Britain and France, to be given assurances when it comes to the protection of overseas dependencies such as the Falklands Islands and French Guiana that full military action would be taken to defend them if necessary.

A centralised European military like a EUSF would face many hurdles before it could ever become a reality but the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy⁵ and the European Defence Agency⁶, which is designed to facilitate EU wide defence cooperation, procurement and research, has been a good start. If the EUSF comes into existence it would give us an opportunity to drive up the overall quality of EU armed forces, particularly form poorer member states, whilst at the same time driving down procurement costs and improving expenditure efficiency.

In the 21st Century power projection is going to increasingly be the name of the game. The nature and focus of conflicts is likely to shift in the face of an ever growing global population towards smaller scale engagements in areas of resource scarcity. The multiplicity of potential flash points across the globe will require a well-funded, highly motivated and adaptable force to counter them. The volatile nature of much of the EUs neighbours from North Africa and the Middle East to the Balkans and the Caucasus means there is going to be, for the foreseeable future, a necessity for Europe to defend itself and its allies. The question the EU has to ask itself is, do we want to get more ‘bang for our euro?’.

¹ C. Mölling, July 2012. ‘The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members’, Center on the United States and Europe. Brookings.

² P. Allen, S. Jeffery, January 2012. ‘US defence review: the shape of the US military overseas’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2012/jan/06/us-military-deployment-map?INTCMP=SRCH. The Guardian.

³ D.Keohane, May 2012. ^‘Does NATO matter for US defence policy?’, FRIDE.

⁴ I. Traynor, September 2012. ‘EU heavyweights call for radical foreign and defence policy overhaul’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/18/eu-foreign-defence-policy-overhaul. The Guardian.

⁵ Wikipedia, November 2012. ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Foreign_and_Security_Policy#1957.E2.80.931993.

⁶ European Defence Agency, November 2012. ‘About us’, http://www.eda.europa.eu/home.